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# The Gen X Confidence Number

What a six-month moving average of a survey subsample can and cannot tell you about the highest-spending generation in America

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## About this report

Every substantive claim in this report carries an evidence classification and, where applicable, a numbered source. Facts are separated from vendor claims, third-party estimates, the author's assessments, and untested hypotheses. Forward-looking sections use scenarios with observable tripwires rather than point forecasts. Stated assumptions are listed before the analysis begins.



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## Scope and evidentiary standard

In the first week of August 2026, a single chart moved through the business press: Generation X now records the lowest consumer confidence of any American generation, a six-month moving average of roughly 78 on The Conference Board's Consumer Confidence Index, against readings near 106 to 110 for Millennials and Gen Z. The story was picked up by Axios, then by Fortune, then by a long tail of aggregators, and it arrives with an implied commercial conclusion attached: the generation that spends the most is about to stop.

This report assesses that claim. It covers what the underlying instrument measures, where the generational cut came from, what the source organization itself said in the same month, whether confidence at this level has been predicting spending, and which parts of the Gen X financial squeeze survive scrutiny once the sponsored surveys are discounted. It does not forecast Gen X spending to a number.

The evidence base here has a specific and unusual weakness. The central data series is not published. The Conference Board releases a monthly index and a paragraph of commentary by age, income, generation, and political affiliation, but the generational point values circulating in the press come from a chart supplied to a newsroom, not from a public table anyone can download and check. Two respected outlets describing the same series in the same week disagree with each other on two of four values. Layered on top of that, most of the supporting evidence about Gen X retirement anxiety is produced by firms that sell retirement products.

Every substantive claim below therefore carries a classification, and any claim resting on an external source carries a numbered reference that links to the source list at the end. Where the evidence does not exist, that is stated rather than smoothed over.

| Label | Definition | How to treat it |
|---|---|---|
| FACT | Verifiable in the cited primary source: a filing, press release, official | Reliable as stated. Check the source if the exact wording matters. |

| Label | Definition | How to treat it |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | documentation, or standards body announcement. | |
| VENDOR CLAIM | Reported by a vendor about its own business or product. Self-measured and not audited by any third party. | The vendor said it. Directionally useful, not a measurement. Definitions of the metric are usually undisclosed. |
| THIRD-PARTY ESTIMATE | A research firm forecast or survey result. Methodology is proprietary and generally not reproducible. | Use for direction and order of magnitude only. Do not build a model on it. |
| ASSESSMENT | The author's reasoned judgment from the cited evidence. Falsifiable, and the reasoning is shown so it can be argued with. | This is analysis, not reporting. Disagree with it where your evidence differs. |
| HYPOTHESIS | A proposition offered for testing. Not currently supported by sufficient evidence to assert. | Treat as a research question, not a conclusion. Each one names what would confirm or refute it. |
| SCENARIO | A structured future state with a stated subjective probability. The probability is the author's judgment, not a calculated figure. | Use the leading indicators attached to each, not the probability. The indicators are observable; the probability is not. |

## Assumptions this analysis rests on

Four premises are assumed rather than demonstrated. Each paragraph names what fails if the premise is wrong.

### One. The press figures faithfully render Conference Board data

The values of 78.4 for Gen X, 80.0 for Baby Boomers, and 106.0 for Millennials are taken from the chart annotation in the Axios piece, which credits The Conference Board as the data source. No public table confirms them. If the chart was mislabeled or the series was recut for the story, findings one through four in the executive summary lose their factual base, though the assessment of the confidence-to-spending link does not depend on the exact values.

### Two. The generational series is a subsample split of the same monthly survey

The Consumer Confidence Survey is an online panel study conducted by Toluna. Splitting one monthly sample into five generational buckets leaves subsamples in the hundreds, which is the most plausible reason the generational figures are only ever reported as six-month moving averages. Nothing public confirms the per-generation counts or their margins of error. If those subsamples are smaller than assumed, the reading of a steady slide since early 2025 is weaker than it appears, and month-level movement in the generational series is close to meaningless.

### Three. Attitude and budget constraint are separable

The analysis assumes a household can report low confidence and keep spending, and that the two series can diverge for extended periods. This is not a controversial assumption, but it is load-bearing. If confidence and outlay are tightly coupled at the household level and the aggregate data is simply hiding the coupling, the central finding of this report is wrong.

### Four. Cohort boundaries are close enough across sources to compare

Axios describes Gen X as ages 45 to 61. Numerator uses birth years 1965 to 1981. NIQ describes the cohort as ages 45 to 60. The common definition runs roughly 1965 to 1980. These differ by up to two years at each boundary. The report assumes the surveys cited are describing substantially the same people. Where a claim would flip on a two-year boundary shift, it is not made.

## Executive summary

The number is real, the framing around it is not, and the gap between the two is where the commercial mistake lives. Six findings follow.

**FINDING 1 The headline describes a smoothed level, not a fresh collapse.**

> ASSESSMENT A six-month moving average reported in early August is a statement about February through July. By construction it cannot show a turn until the turn is roughly half over. Reporting it as news of what Gen X feels right now inverts what the statistic does. The same instrument's July release describes movement that is not visible in the smoothed line at all. [1] [2]

**FINDING 2 The Conference Board's own July language points in a different direction than the coverage.**

> FACT The July 28 release states that on a six-month moving average basis, confidence among consumers aged 35 to 54 showed the greatest improvement, and that by generation, confidence fell the most for the Silent Generation. Neither sentence supports a story about Gen X deteriorating fastest. The press framing rests on a level, the source organization commented on a direction, and the two were merged. [1]

**FINDING 3 Two accounts of the same series disagree on half the values.**

> FACT The Axios chart annotation gives Baby Boomers 80.0 and Millennials 106.0. Fortune's text, published four days later and citing the same index, gives Boomers 83 and describes Gen Z and Millennials at around 110. On Gen X the two agree at 78 and 78.4. A three-point spread on Boomers is larger than the entire monthly move in the headline index, which fell 1.4 points in July. [1] [2] [3]

**FINDING 4 The age gradient in this survey predates the current squeeze.**

> ASSESSMENT Consumers under 35 have been the most confident cohort in this series since roughly the summer of 2023, and the same pattern of younger-is-higher appeared in the February 2026 readings. A cross-sectional gap of thirty points between the youngest and oldest cohorts is a standing feature of the instrument, not a July development. Treating the level as the story means rediscovering the gradient every time someone charts it. [4]

### FINDING 5 Confidence at this level has not been predicting spending, and the same survey says so.

ASSESSMENT Inside the July release, homebuying and auto purchase expectations continued an upward trend, travel intentions perked up, and planned spending on services rose. Retail sales rose 6.7 percent year over year in June against 3.5 percent inflation. Michigan sentiment sat in the second percentile of its own history while consumers kept buying. A reader taking 78.4 as a demand signal would have been positioned wrongly for most of the last four years. [1] [5] [6]

### FINDING 6 The structural Gen X squeeze is real, and is measured almost entirely by firms selling the remedy.

ASSESSMENT Simultaneous support of aging parents and dependent children, a thin pension base, and long-term care costs rising faster than general inflation are all documented and all plausible. But the headline retirement figures come from Northwestern Mutual, Allianz, Fidelity, and Equitable, each of which sells products to the anxiety being measured. That does not make the numbers false. It does mean the gap they describe should be read as a directional finding, not a measurement. [7] [8] [9] [10] [11]

### FINDING 7 Cohort composition, not age, may be doing much of the work.

HYPOTHESIS Richmond Fed researchers found the partisan gap in sentiment to be considerably larger than the gap across income, age, or education. Generational cohorts differ systematically in party affiliation, so a generational sentiment gap could be substantially a political composition effect wearing a demographic label. Confirming this needs the crosstab of generation by political affiliation from the Consumer Confidence Survey. Refuting it needs the generational gap to persist after that adjustment. [12]

## What the instrument actually measures

FACT The Conference Board Consumer Confidence Index fell 1.4 points to 90.8 in July 2026, from an upwardly revised 92.2 in June. The Present Situation Index, covering current business and labor conditions, fell 3.6 points to 114.9, its third consecutive monthly decline. The Expectations Index, covering the six-month outlook for income, business, and labor, was unchanged at 74.7. The survey window ran July 1 to 22 with a preliminary cutoff of July 22. [1]

FACT The two halves of the index are pointing in opposite directions relative to their own history. The Present Situation reading of 114.9 is comfortably above the 1985 base of 100. The Expectations reading of 74.7 has sat below 80 since February 2025, the level conventionally associated with elevated recession risk. [1] [13]

**FIGURE 1** **The index and its two halves, July 2026**




**FACT** Index, 1985=100. The headline is an average of two components that disagree: consumers rate today above the historical base and the next six months well below it. Preliminary July values, cutoff July 22. [1]

**ASSESSMENT** This split matters for reading the generational story. A cohort can post a low composite while rating its own present circumstances tolerably, if its forward expectations are bleak. Nothing published breaks the generational series into Present Situation and Expectations, so it is not knowable from the outside whether Gen X at 78 is reporting a bad present, a bad outlook, or both. That is a large hole in the middle of a widely circulated number. [1] [2]

**FACT** The survey is an online panel study conducted for The Conference Board by Toluna. It is not a probability sample of US households, and the index is published on the last Tuesday of each month with revisions the following month. June's reading was revised up to 92.2 after initially printing lower. [1]

**ASSESSMENT** Two consequences follow for anyone using this data commercially. Revisions of half a point or more are routine, so a monthly move of 1.4 points is barely outside the revision band. And a panel instrument measures the attitudes of people who join panels, which is a defensible proxy for population attitude and a poor proxy for population behavior. The Conference Board does not claim otherwise; the coverage does. [1]

## Where the generational cut came from

**FACT** The public July release describes the generational breakdown in one sentence: by generation, confidence for Gen Z and Millennials remained the highest, while confidence fell the most for the Silent Generation on a six-month moving average basis. It gives no point values for any generation. [1]

**FACT** The point values in circulation come from a chart published by Axios on August 3, credited to The Conference Board, tracking a six-month rolling average by generation from October 2021 to July 2026. Its annotation reports Millennials peaking at 126.6 and ending at 106.0, Boomers falling from 117.3 to 80.0, and Gen X dropping to 78.4. [2]

**FACT** Fortune, publishing on August 7 and citing the Conference Board index, gives Gen X a six-month average of 78, describes it as the worst in at least four and a half years, puts Boomers at 83 and calls that their lowest since October 2021, and describes Gen Z and Millennials as holding roughly steady at around 110. [3]

**FIGURE 2** **Two accounts of the same series, four days apart**




**THIRD-PARTY ESTIMATE** Six-month moving average, index 1985=100, both attributed to The Conference Board for July 2026. The Millennials figure in the Fortune account is an approximation given jointly for Gen Z and Millennials. Neither source publishes the underlying table. [2] [3]

**ASSESSMENT** The disagreement is not a scandal and neither outlet did anything unusual. It is a demonstration of what happens when a number reaches the public through a chart rather than a data release. The Gen X value replicates across both accounts, which is mild support for it. The Boomer value does not, and the three-point spread there is more than twice the July move in the headline index. Anyone building a plan on the size of the generational gap is building on a figure with an unstated error bar. [1] [2] [3]

**ASSESSMENT** The recut also creates a definitional seam. The Conference Board's published monthly commentary reports age in bands of under 35, 35 to 54, and 55 and over. Gen X at ages 45 to 61 straddles the second and third bands. So the age paragraph and the generation paragraph in the same release are not two views of one cut, they are two different cuts, and a reader can take the age sentence and the generation sentence to mean different things about the same people without either being wrong. [1] [2]

## The sentence the coverage left out

**FACT** In the same July release that produced the 78.4 chart, The Conference Board wrote that on a six-month moving average basis, by age, confidence for consumers under 35 remained the highest, while confidence among those aged 35 to 54 showed the greatest improvement. [1]

**ASSESSMENT** The 35 to 54 band contains roughly two thirds of Gen X. The organization producing the data said that band improved more than any other in July, and the coverage built from that same release said Gen X is not OK. Both can be true at once, because one is a level and the other is a change. But only one of them was reported, and the one that was reported is the one that cannot turn quickly by construction. [1] [2]

**FACT** The cross-instrument picture points the same way. University of Michigan consumer sentiment rose almost 12 percent in July to a final 55.2, a five-month high, with improvements described as broad-based across income, education, wealth, age, and political party. Year-ahead inflation expectations eased from 4.6 to 4.2 percent. [5]

**ASSESSMENT** Two national sentiment instruments moved in opposite directions in the same month, one down 1.4 points and the other up almost 12 percent. That divergence is itself the most useful piece of information in the July data, and it argues for treating both as noisy attitude measures rather than either as a demand signal. The most likely proximate cause is energy prices, which fell during the window and which the Michigan survey has tracked closely through the Iran conflict. [1] [5] [14]

**THIRD-PARTY ESTIMATE** For scale on how depressed the Michigan series has been, its final July reading of 55.2 sits at roughly the second percentile of the survey's own history despite the monthly jump, and remains about 10.5 percent below the year-ago level. [14]

## Does the number predict anything

**FACT** US retail sales rose 0.2 percent month over month in June 2026, following an upwardly revised 1.0 percent in May. Excluding gas stations, where falling pump prices suppressed the nominal figure, sales rose 0.7 percent. [6]

**FACT** On a year-over-year basis the June figure was stronger: total retail and food services outlays rose 6.7 percent against inflation of 3.5 percent, with specialty apparel in-store sales up 4.8 percent, department stores up 3.7 percent, and non-store retailers up 14.2 percent. [15]

**FACT** Inside the July Consumer Confidence release, homebuying and auto purchasing expectations continued an upward trend on a six-month moving average basis, spending plans for televisions, refrigerators, and washing machines rose, consumers planned to spend more on services over the next six months, and overall travel intentions perked up after easing for most of the year. [1]

**ASSESSMENT** That last item is the strongest single piece of evidence in this report. The purchase-intention questions and the confidence questions come from the same respondents in the same instrument in the same month. Confidence at 90.8 and falling sits alongside rising intentions to buy houses, cars, appliances, and airfare. Whatever the composite index is capturing, it is not the respondents' own stated plans to spend. [1]

**THIRD-PARTY ESTIMATE** Federal Reserve research has been arguing the general version of this point for years. Richmond Fed work found the partisan gap in sentiment to be considerably larger than the gap across income, age, or education level, meaning a large share of what these surveys move on is which party holds the White House rather than what the respondent's budget is doing. [12]

 

ASSESSMENT One frequently repeated claim in this space, that a February 2026 Kansas City Fed paper titled Forecasting with Feelings found the link between sentiment and real household spending growth to be modest, appears in this report only as a second-hand attribution from a commentary blog run by an advisory firm. The primary paper was not located. It is noted because it is circulating, and no conclusion here rests on it. [16]

## Who Gen X actually is, commercially

THIRD-PARTY ESTIMATE Numerator panel data puts Gen X at about 34 percent of US spending across consumer packaged goods, general merchandise, and quick-service restaurants, roughly level since 2020, with Boomers and older at 33.7 percent after a near ten-point decline, Millennials at 26.1 percent, and Gen Z at 6.1 percent. [17]

**FIGURE 3 Share of US spending by generation, CPG plus general merchandise plus quick-service**




THIRD-PARTY ESTIMATE Panel-derived shares from a commercial measurement firm, covering three retail categories rather than total consumption. Housing, healthcare, and services are excluded, which understates the older cohorts. [17]

THIRD-PARTY ESTIMATE The same source reports Gen X households spending about 25,500 dollars annually across those categories, more than any other generation, across roughly 824 shopping trips a year at about 31 dollars per trip, with 45 percent of Gen X households earning more than 125,000 dollars. [18]

VENDOR CLAIM NIQ and World Data Lab project Gen X leading global consumer spending from 2021 through 2033, at 15.2 trillion dollars in 2025 and a projected 23 trillion dollars by 2035, and describe high-income markets as holding that pattern from 2026 to 2036. [19]

ASSESSMENT The trillion-dollar projections should be treated as marketing collateral for a data product, not as a forecast to plan against. A single-generation global spending total to 2035 requires assumptions about population, income growth, exchange rates, and cohort boundaries that are not disclosed. The useful part of that work is the ordering, not the magnitude: Gen X is currently the largest spending cohort and will hand that position over sometime in the next decade. [19]

ASSESSMENT This is why the confidence story attracted attention. If the cohort holding roughly a third of measured retail spending is genuinely retrenching, that is a demand event. The evidence in the preceding section says it is not retrenching, and the evidence in the following section says the pressure on it is nonetheless real. Both things being true at once is the actual situation, and it is less quotable than either half. [1] [17]

## The squeeze that survives discounting

The financial pressure on this cohort is separable from the confidence number, better documented than the confidence number, and worse sourced than it looks. Each claim below is labeled by who paid for the measurement.

THIRD-PARTY ESTIMATE TransUnion's Q2 2026 Consumer Pulse study, based on 2,996 US adults surveyed April 23 to May 11, found Gen X selecting unaffordable more than any other generation for every purchase type over the prior three months, and reported inflation as a top-three household financial concern for 83 percent of consumers overall, up two points year over year. [20]

THIRD-PARTY ESTIMATE The same study found 55 percent of consumers optimistic about their household finances over the next 12 months, unchanged from a year earlier, with 68 percent of Gen Z and 63 percent of Millennials optimistic and Baby Boomers most pessimistic at 28 percent, down from 36 percent a year earlier. [20]

FIGURE 4 **Categories consumers rate least affordable**


THIRD-PARTY ESTIMATE All consumers, not Gen X specifically. The Gen X finding in this study is reported directionally, as choosing unaffordable more often than other cohorts, without published per-category figures for the cohort. [20]

ASSESSMENT Note what the two TransUnion findings do together. The generation reporting the sharpest affordability strain is not the generation reporting the most pessimism about its own finances; that is Baby Boomers, at 28 percent optimistic and falling. Affordability pressure and stated confidence are measuring different things even inside a single survey, which is the same lesson the Conference Board data teaches. [20]

VENDOR CLAIM Northwestern Mutual's 2024 Planning and Progress Study reported Gen X believing it needs 1.56 million dollars to retire comfortably against an average of 108,600 dollars saved. The 2025 edition of the same study put the target at 1.57 million dollars. [7] [21]

**FIGURE 5 Gen X stated retirement target against reported average savings**


VENDOR CLAIM US dollars, thousands. Self-reported figures from a survey commissioned by a firm that sells retirement products. An average conceals the distribution entirely: a cohort with a small number of well-funded households and a large number of unfunded ones produces this figure, and so does a uniformly underfunded one. [7]

VENDOR CLAIM Allianz Life reported 70 percent of Gen X saying they fear running out of money more than they fear death, against 66 percent of Millennials and 61 percent of Boomers, with 44 percent not confident they can save enough for retirement, against 35 percent of Millennials and 40 percent of Boomers. [8]

VENDOR CLAIM A CFP Board survey found 95 percent of Gen X respondents saying financial regrets had cost them money, with 59 percent reporting stress and 40 percent reporting anxiety tied to those regrets. [9]

VENDOR CLAIM Equitable research reported that only 14 percent of Gen X has access to a traditional pension against 44 percent of Baby Boomers, that nearly eight in ten Gen X respondents feel confident in their investment decisions, and that 40 percent lack a written financial plan. [11]

ASSESSMENT Read across those four, a pattern appears that none of them state. The same cohort reports high confidence in its own investment decisions and high fear of running out of money. That is not a contradiction, it is what a first defined-contribution generation looks like: competent at the mechanics, structurally short of the balance, and correctly aware of the difference. The retirement anxiety is a balance-sheet fact, not a mood. [8] [11]

THIRD-PARTY ESTIMATE The caregiving cost side is the least commercially contaminated piece of the picture. An AARP report published in June 2026 found home care inflation up 7.9 percent over five years, nearly double overall inflation and about triple medical inflation, with nursing home costs up 25 percent between 2019 and 2024 against 22 percent income growth for households over 65. [10]

ASSESSMENT That last comparison is the mechanism the confidence surveys cannot see. When the cost of a parent's care outruns the parent's income, the gap is absorbed by the adult child, and the adult children in question are currently aged 45 to 61. This is a transfer of an inflation shock from a cohort with fixed income to a cohort with peak income, and it does not appear in either household's spending data as caregiving. It appears as reduced saving. [10]

THIRD-PARTY ESTIMATE A 2024 Harris Poll for Nationwide reported 56 percent of Gen X investors providing financial support to both aging parents and adult children at once, with 23 percent having reduced or halted retirement contributions specifically because of it. [21]

## Why point forecasts fail here

Three properties of this subject rule out a forecast, and they compound.

ASSESSMENT First, the input series is smoothed and unpublished. A six-month moving average that cannot be independently reconstructed cannot be extrapolated with a stated error. The most that can be said about the direction of the underlying monthly series is what the source organization chooses to describe in prose, and in July it described the relevant age band as improving. [1] [2]

ASSESSMENT Second, the dominant short-run driver of both sentiment instruments in 2026 has been energy prices tied to the Middle East conflict, which is a geopolitical variable rather than a consumer one. Michigan sentiment set a record low in May as pump prices spiked, then recovered almost 12 percent by July as they eased. Forecasting the confidence series is therefore mostly forecasting the Strait of Hormuz, which no consumer analyst should pretend to do. [5] [14] [22]

ASSESSMENT Third, the relationship being forecast is the weak one. Even a perfectly measured confidence series would be a poor spending predictor at these levels, on the evidence of the last four years and of the purchase-intention questions in the same survey. A confident forecast of Gen X spending derived from Gen X confidence would be precision applied to the wrong link. [1] [6] [12]

## Scenarios

Four structured outcomes for Gen X spending behavior through the end of 2027. The probabilities are subjective and are the least reliable content in this report. The earliest visible signs are the most useful, because each is observable without private information.

### SCENARIO A Decoupling holds 50 percent

> Gen X six-month confidence stays roughly in the 75 to 90 band while Gen X nominal spending continues to grow at or near the retail average.
>
> **Consequence.** Confidence coverage keeps generating headlines that carry no commercial signal, and firms that repositioned around Gen X retrenchment lose share to firms that did not.

 

**Earliest visible sign.** Two more monthly Conference Board releases describing rising purchase and travel intentions while the generational averages stay flat.

### SCENARIO B Mix shift without volume loss 30 percent

Total Gen X outlay holds, but composition moves toward value channels, private label, longer replacement cycles, and away from discretionary services.

**Consequence.** Category-level damage concentrated in dining, travel, and premium durables while headline retail stays healthy, which is the pattern most likely to be misread as an aggregate downturn.

**Earliest visible sign.** Restaurant and bar sales flat or negative for two consecutive months while total retail excluding gas stays positive.

### SCENARIO C Confidence turns out to have led 15 percent

Gen X discretionary spending contracts in real terms during the second half of 2026 or the first half of 2027, and the August 2026 coverage reads in hindsight as an early warning.

**Consequence.** The purchase-intention data in the current survey would have been actively misleading, and the case for treating attitude series as demand indicators would be materially stronger than this report allows.

**Earliest visible sign.** Revolving credit balances for the 45 to 60 age group accelerating while the personal saving rate falls, indicating spending sustained on credit rather than income.

### SCENARIO D Fast convergence 5 percent

Energy and grocery price relief lifts the older cohorts disproportionately and the generational spread narrows below 15 points by mid-2027.

**Consequence.** The whole generational framing dissolves and the story is retold as an inflation-memory effect among older consumers, which is what several economists have argued it always was.

**Earliest visible sign.** Two consecutive Conference Board releases describing improvement concentrated in the 55-and-over band.

## Leading indicators

Observable events, what each would mean, which scenario it moves toward, and where to watch. None requires paid data.

| If this happens | It means | Moves toward | Where to watch |
|---|---|---|---|
| **The 35 to 54 age band improves in the six-month average for three consecutive releases** | The July improvement was a turn rather than sampling noise | A, D | The Conference Board monthly release, the paragraph beginning "On a six-month moving average basis, by age" |

 

| If this happens | It means | Moves toward | Where to watch |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Food services and drinking places sales go flat or negative for two months while total retail excluding gas stays positive** | Discretionary trade-down inside a stable total budget | B | Census Bureau advance monthly retail trade, food services line |
| **Revolving credit growth accelerates while the personal saving rate falls** | Spending is being sustained on credit rather than income, which is the precondition for a genuine pullback | C | Federal Reserve G.19 consumer credit, BEA personal saving rate |
| **Home care and nursing cost inflation stays above 6 percent annually** | The caregiving transfer keeps compounding regardless of what confidence does | B, C | BLS CPI for medical care services, AARP long-term care cost tracking |
| **The Expectations Index crosses back above 80** | The component that has been below the recession-signal threshold since February 2025 clears it | A, D | The Conference Board monthly release, Expectations Index |
| **The Conference Board begins publishing generational point values in the release itself** | The central data problem in this report is resolved and the series becomes checkable | All | conference-board.org consumer confidence page and monthly press release |

## Implications

### For brands and category managers

ASSESSMENT Do not reprice or reposition a Gen X-heavy category on the strength of this number. The actionable version of the same evidence is narrower and better supported: this cohort is reporting affordability strain in gas, travel, and dining while continuing to buy durables and services. That argues for value framing inside premium positions and for holding replacement-cycle categories steady, not for a defensive repricing. [1] [20]

ASSESSMENT The loyalty characteristics of this cohort make an overreaction expensive. If a category leader trades down its own positioning on a confidence headline and the decoupling scenario holds, it has given away price with no volume defense in return, in a cohort that does not switch back quickly. [17] [18]

### For investors

ASSESSMENT Treat generational sentiment cuts as a sentiment indicator about the press, not about demand. The tradeable content in the July data is the divergence between two national instruments in the same month and the continued strength of purchase intentions, neither of which was the story that ran. Position sizing on the 78.4 figure specifically is position sizing on an unpublished series with a demonstrated three-point discrepancy in an adjacent value. [1] [2] [3] [5]

### For advisors and workplace benefit designers

ASSESSMENT The retirement gap is the durable finding in this report and it is not a confidence problem. A cohort with 14 percent pension access, high self-reported investment competence, and 40 percent lacking a written plan has a coordination and product problem rather than an education problem. The caregiving cost transfer is the specific exposure worth designing against, because it is the one line item that can consume a decade of catch-up contributions without appearing in anyone's retirement projection. [10] [11] [21]

## What this document cannot answer

Six questions would materially change the analysis and none can be settled from public sources.

FACT The per-generation subsample sizes and margins of error in the Consumer Confidence Survey. Without them, the difference between 78.4 and 80.0 may or may not be a difference at all. [1]

FACT Whether the generational series is population-weighted, and how respondents are assigned to generations. A two-year boundary shift moves people between Gen X and Boomers in exactly the age range where the gap is narrowest. [1] [2]

FACT The Present Situation and Expectations split within the Gen X series. A cohort rating today badly is a different commercial situation from one rating the next six months badly, and the published data does not distinguish them. [1]

FACT Whether the generational sentiment gap survives adjustment for political affiliation. This requires a crosstab The Conference Board does not publish, and it is the single test that would resolve finding seven. [1] [12]

FACT Whether Gen X real spending, net of caregiving transfers, insurance, and healthcare, is growing or shrinking. Retail panel data covers the categories where the answer is likely to be least interesting. [17] [18]

FACT Whether the sponsored retirement surveys use comparable cohort definitions, sampling frames, and question wording. They are routinely quoted alongside one another as though they do. [7] [8] [9] [11]

## Half-life of this assessment

Readers arriving later should discount by section.

ASSESSMENT Six months. Every point value in this report: 90.8, 114.9, 74.7, 78.4, 80.0, 106.0, 55.2, and the June retail figures. The July direction of both sentiment instruments. The affordability rankings from the Q2 study. Treat these as a snapshot of a window that ended in July 2026. [1] [5] [6] [20]

ASSESSMENT Twelve months. The scenario probabilities, which are subjective and were set before any of the tripwires triggered. The characterization of energy prices as the dominant short-run driver, which holds only while the conflict does. [5] [22]

ASSESSMENT Twenty-four months. The Gen X spending share figures and the retirement gap magnitudes. Both move slowly, but the spending share in particular is on a known trajectory: this cohort's lead is projected to end sometime in the 2030s and the handover will be visible well before it completes. [17] [19]

ASSESSMENT Architectural, and unlikely to decay. The age gradient in this survey. The gap between what sentiment instruments measure and what households do. The partisan contamination of sentiment data. The structural position of a first defined-contribution generation carrying a caregiving transfer. These are properties of the instruments and the cohort, not readings from a month. [1] [10] [12]

## Limitations

The author has no financial relationship with The Conference Board, TransUnion, NIQ, World Data Lab, Numerator, Northwestern Mutual, Allianz Life, Fidelity, Equitable, the CFP Board, or AARP, and received no compensation from any party for this assessment. No source cited here was given an opportunity to review it.

The central weakness is stated up front rather than buried: the primary data series is not publicly available in tabular form. This report reasons about a series it has not seen, using two press renderings of it that disagree on two of four values, plus the source organization's own prose commentary. That is a thinner base than the confidence of the coverage implies, and it is the reason this report makes no numeric forecast.

The retirement and caregiving evidence is dominated by surveys commissioned by firms that sell retirement products, insurance, and advice. Each such claim is labeled VENDOR above. Their consistency with one another is weak corroboration, because they share an incentive and often a methodology vendor. The AARP cost figures and the Census retail data are the least contaminated inputs used here.

One claim in circulation, a February 2026 Kansas City Fed paper on sentiment and household spending, is included only as an unverified second-hand attribution from a commercially interested commentary source, and no conclusion rests on it. Similarly, no aggregator or content-farm restatement of the Axios and Fortune pieces was used, though several were encountered during research and several contained figures not present in either original.

Finally, this report treats generations as a reporting convention rather than a causal category. Age, life stage, income, caregiving status, and political affiliation all vary systematically across birth cohorts. Attributing a sentiment gap to the cohort label rather than to those underlying variables is a common error and the analysis here tries not to make it, but it cannot fully avoid it while using data that is cut that way.

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